Ndalu pak abetting

Whilst each of the different post-colonial conflict DDR processes occurred in a localized setting, certain comparative elements transcended state boundaries. The chapter compares the three peace processes that ended each conflict and where DDR fit within each different structural and organizational NOTES 11 framework, noting the particular deficiencies and effectiveness. Although equipped with the latitude to craft contextualized programmes, none of the countries had a good formula for doing long-term reintegration in the aftermath of DD; which turned out to be a very long-term process, that calls for patience, experimentation and determination.

Moreover, in the context of post-colonial transitions there were more urgent state- and nation-building priorities that overwhelmed long-term reintegration. Given the sacrifices made by many men and women who joined the liberation struggles without money or education and were left as poor and disadvantaged as they were before, the chapter is a poignant reminder that in some conflicts even the victorious suffer huge personal losses and opportunity costs.

Significantly, reintegration is a protracted and experimental process that calls for patience and determination. Notes 1. The former liberation combatants are variously known as ex-combatants or ex-fighters or former fighters or former freedom fighters or war veterans. See A. See, for example, Z. Bhebe and T. Ranger, eds. Cilliers, ed. Motumi and A. Mashike and M. Shelton, D. Monyue, A. Pullinger, M.

As noted by A. Bryden, T. Donais and H. What is generally called postconflict does not really mean after the end of conflict as conflict never ends. At best, it refers to a situation after the cessation of violent conflict or after the conclusion of a peace agreement.

The broader concept of peacebuilding aims not solely at avoiding the recurrence of war, but also at strengthening the fabric of peace through socio-economic development and democracy building. NOTES 13 9. See G. For an analysis of peace processes and DDR see R. Muggah with M. Rieger, Negotiating disarmament and demobilization in peace processes: what is the state of evidence? For a detailed analysis of the debate around cash payments and public sector employment see J.

These post-colonial states typified the notion of a Weberian rational-legal state enjoying a monopoly of the legitimate use of force. DDR has also been carried out in the more contemporary UN-mandated peace operation contexts as part of peace settlements to end civil wars in fragmented states such as in the DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

This chapter draws on the range of existing literature to build a conceptual foundation for examining the different dimensions of post-liberation war DDR in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. The study acknowledges that DDR is context-specific, does not always progress in a simple and sequential linear fashion and there is no universal model for sequencing the components of DDR.

This purposeful analytical framework is essential for understanding why and how DDR happened the way it did in the three cases. Disarmament Disarmament is generally concerned with the management of arms and ammunition in order to create secure and stable frameworks out of usually volatile war-to-peace transitions.

It is mainly a military operation involving the removal of these tools of violence from the hands of combatants usually of non-state armed groups such as in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Sometimes, the civilian population is also targeted, like in Kenya and Uganda. Disarmament is essential for reducing the number of weapons in society and restoring the monopoly over the means of violence to the state. Reduction in the prevalence of small arms and light weapons SALW can contribute to post-conflict stability and security by making a rapid remobilization for violence trickier.

There are many approaches to disarmament, including coercive, consensual and voluntary, or induced. Coercive disarmament is normally implemented after an outright military victory by one of the parties, such as in Uganda in , Rwanda in and Angola in Where disarmament is carried out as part of a peace process it is normally voluntary, such as in the three post-colonial DDR cases under study. Individual combatants may be inclined to retain guns as a source of profit or security.

Disarmament relies on the goodwill and mutual confidence of the parties and commitment to the peace process. If the parties are not confident the peace deal will hold or there is perceived insecurity, the temptation to conceal some of their fighters and weapons will be strong such as in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. A classic example remains Angola. Demobilization Demobilization is normally a short-term process that aims to reduce the size of the armed forces or non-state armed groups through their downsizing or complete disbandment as part of a broader transformation from war to peace.

For instance, as the months ticked by some Angolan fighters spontaneously demobilized rather than wait for the snail-paced official process to run its course and resorted to self-help violence such as banditry and crime. Reintegration is primarily a civilian process and probably the last phase of transforming ex-fighters into a civilian nature that is congruent with peace. It is generally a complex, long-term process undertaken at multiple social, political, economic and psychological levels.

A wide range of reintegration initiatives has been designed to ensure relief assistance, build capacity and eventual long-term self-sufficiency of the beneficiaries. The planned reintegration programme should, however, revolve around realistic and achievable targets. This prevents the emergence of a crisis of expectations among ex-combatants that could engender conflict between disenchanted beneficiaries and the government and broader society.

Post-colonial contexts emerging from devastating wars with widespread destruction of national institutions, infrastructure and economic bases are inimical to reintegration. Limited employment opportunities are the norm in such situations. Short- to medium-term reintegration can thus be aided by opportunities created by public works programmes, which still may be difficult to achieve in impoverished post-war states. Public sector employment and self-employment through small businesses have also been significant long-term economic reintegration initiatives.

The involvement of civil society groups and the wider community in which the former combatants are supposed to reintegrate is important. Civil society groups that are bridge-builders, truth-finders, watchdogs, human rights defenders and agents of social protection and economic revitalization can help build reconciliation, lessen the appeal of those who might try to reignite conflict and help prepare local communities to receive back demobilized soldiers.

Moreover, they could help reformulate previously exclusionary social, political and economic practices to promote successful reintegration, particularly of female ex-fighters. Traditional healing and cleansing ceremonies can also help to reintegrate ex-combatants into the community like in rural Mozambique and Sierra Leone.

However, the early DDR cases still retain relevance, particularly in enhancing the lessons-learnt aspects for the study of DDR. Target Group The post-colonial cases targeted combatants from liberation armies and did not incorporate comprehensive community-based DDR programming. Significantly, the highly politicized liberation war veterans occupy a symbolic position in the body politic of post-colonial conflict contexts due to their roles in the armed liberation struggles.

Representative associations of war veterans with a common identity and camaraderie that appeals to the liberation struggle allow them to more directly press welfare claims on the governments. These complex landscapes of force, arising from the need to prosecute multilayered, cross-cutting conflicts, normally encompass a huge array of forces including international forces; governmental military, paramilitary and other security elements; warlords, rebel forces and various militias with equally variable loyalties; community, traditional and local security organs; and private commercial security.

At its height, the MDRP targeted approximately , ex-combatants in the seven countries. These were drawn from an eclectic mix of military and paramilitary groups. The rebel groups continued to go through cyclical processes of disarming and rearming making it difficult to establish easily identifiable features of ex-combatants or militias and criteria governing the eligibility for DDR.

In post-colonial conflict DDR strong state structures existed to orchestrate home-grown DDR programmes based on specific situational realities. Post-independence state agency is important to flexibly manage new DDR problems as they arise in a manner that promotes the long-term reintegration of ex-liberation fighters.

These renewed initiatives improve the long-term livelihoods, and buys the peace, of the ex-combatant community. They also demonstrate how the state could resist the logics of liberal interventions, particularly the approach of international actors who discourage public sector spending in DDR. The establishment of dedicated government departments for war veteran affairs significantly amplifies state agency.

State agency in the design and implementation of DDR, like any other agency, contains worthy elements as well as lamentable ones. For example, the government can use reintegration support as a bait to entice and establish hold on liberation war veterans, a politically important niche of the electorate.

For its part, the opposition can use botched reintegration and perceived neglect of liberation ex-fighters to make the government look inept or uncaring or illegitimate. This, however, demonstrates the significance of ex-combatants as political actors in post-colonial contexts. Here, the distinguishing feature has been that the fragile states lacked political latitude and ability to implement home-grown initiatives and experienced externally led DDR efforts under quasi-imperial UN mandates.

The liberal tradition, which emphasizes the nexus of security and development, has guided much of the DDR programming at the UN. However, state rollback and reallocation of expenditures can inadvertently exacerbate social hardships and entail risks for stability posed by poorly remunerated and disenchanted officers or destitute ex-combatants.

Structural and Organizational Framework The manner in which conflict terminating peace negotiations and agreements frame DDR and the institutional composition can facilitate or hinder its implementation. This is usually informed by specific prevailing politico-security contexts and challenges inherent in DDR itself. This entails limited dependence on external agents to drive DDR in terms of funding, concept development and programme design.

Government ownership of organic DDR processes bodes well for the sustainability of ex-combatant reintegration as the discussion of state agency elsewhere in this study attests. This has enabled peace agreements to become significant entry points for DDR. Moreover, the UN conducts high-profile evaluations of DDR as a precondition for the downsizing or withdrawal of peacekeeping missions, making DDR a key benchmark for post-conflict security.

They aim to improve DDR interventions by linking military issues regarding disarmament with socio-economic issues concerning the welfare of ex-combatants, their dependents and communities. The frameworks and models enshrined in the IDDRS are not obvious silver bullets for complex situations and are adaptable to tailor-made DDR for different country contexts.

The contemporary UN approaches to DDR appreciate that while disarmament by force is possible, voluntary DDR stands a better chance of success and most of the reintegration activities cannot be implemented by force. The IDDRS urge a comprehensive approach to disarmament that acknowledges both the demand and supply sides of the gun problem during post-conflict situations. Disarmament plans have to incorporate the legal and structural side of arms control while recognizing important socioculturally specific attitudes towards guns.

The new governments implemented DDR as the flipside of the complex military integration of hostile statutory colonial and non-statutory liberation forces into new national defence forces that were loyal to the post-colonial state.

DDR programmes aimed at nullifying the potential destabilizing effect of superfluous ex-combatants with military skills on state- and nation-building. As previously stated, the post-colonial conflict security exigencies necessitated immediate but narrow focus on the military, and not the broader security sector embraced in contemporary SSR. The growing recognition of the critical DDR-SSR nexus in contemporary contexts is justified by the intimate link between the absence of effective, efficient, legitimate, representative and accountable security sectors and re genesis of conflict.

There is also a clearer recognition that certain SSR-related decisions can set key parameters for proper DDR planning and vice versa. For instance, key decisions on the size of the army, the extent of new recruitment and the absorption of rebel ex-combatants provide DDR planners with information on the numbers of superfluous ex-combatants that need to be demobilized. Post-conflict Violence Types A fundamental goal of DDR is to enhance stability and development in a post-conflict situation by helping prevent civil war from recurring, crime and violence.

In some cases, the highly politicized liberation war veterans have engaged in political violence to safeguard the power of benefactor liberation movements-cum-ruling parties. In Zimbabwe, which is a prominent case study of ex-combatant political violence, the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front ZANU-PF deployed them in the violent confiscation of farms owned by whites that it accused of backing the opposition. Zimbabwe and South Africa are prime examples in these respective regards.

There are, however, no statistics on the number of South African ex-combatants who are involved in crime making their association with violent crime speculation. In the DRC multiple rebel groups have exploited poorly coordinated and incomplete DDR programmes to re-recruit or recycle militiamen to continue fighting. In Sierra Leone, recruiters exploited ex-combatants frustration with delays in reintegration to re-enlist them with cash inducements and promises of opportunities to loot.

Ex-combatants riots broke in post-conflict countries due to programmatic shortcomings in DDR. In Liberia, the DDR process was marred by inadequate preparations, a lack of timely and adequate funding, which contributed to rioting and the suspension of the programme to allow for reorganization. Riots have also broken out in Mozambique to press the state for ex-combatants welfare.

War veterans have also engaged in politically motivated violence in Mozambique and Sierra Leone. The media, which has a tendency to sensationalize the involvement of former combatants in post-conflict crime, has carried numerous reports implicating them in criminal activities in countries such as Burundi, Liberia and Mozambique. Schulhofer-Wohl and N. Furley and R. May eds. Vines, H.

Thompson, S. Jensen and E. Gleichmann, M. Odenwald and K. Steenken, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A practical field and classroom guide Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit, , p. Adedeji, ed. Kumar, ed. See C. Stark, Lindsay. Curtis and G. Dzinesa eds. Berdal and D. Ucko eds. See D. Kingma ed. Joshi and J. See J. NOTES 31 For detailed analysis see J. See R.

Muggah and C. See also P. Williams, G Cawthra and D. Abrahams eds. See P. Batchelor, K. Kingma and G. Lamb eds. See E. See W. Masunungure ed. Mashike, Former combatants involvement in crime and crime prevention, Research Report, Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, , p.

ZAPU was established in as successor to the banned National Democratic Party, which had been the first major umbrella nationalist movement. ZANU was formed as a splinter group from ZAPU in following internal conflicts among the nationalists that had ethnic, regional and strategy dimensions. The Lancaster House peace process excluded DDR as Britain and the Commonwealth deemed it a prerogative of the elected post-war government. The country had no real comparative template on post-colonial conflict DDR.

This has seen the government conceiving and executing a series of four DDR initiatives in , —, — and At times the government acknowledged methodical failures, learnt lessons and attempted remedial measures. In July , as the government set in motion the fourth and latest reintegration phase, Chris Mutsvangwa who headed the newly created Ministry for Welfare Services for War Veterans, War Collaborators, Ex-Political Detainees and Restrictees instructively pointed out that: It is also none other than ourselves who pioneered DDRRR and gave it to the world, where it was then developed and perfected to be applied as the norm in many post-war situations.

Lamentably, if the myriad of problems that our War Veterans are now facing are taken into consideration, I can be forgiven for concluding that we invented the wheel, gave it to the world, then in time ours got punctured and we seem to have lacked the political will or the means to repair and continue to make best use of that wheel for the reasons for which we had invented it in the first place. As we shall see, the lack of military training would exclude nationalists from the official definition of war veteran during the reintegration scheme.

The nationalists significantly ensured that the two military wings would be subordinated and loyal to them, which would later have a bearing on military integration and DDR. The Rhodesian government established a formidable military machine meant to crush the nationalist liberation movement, with the assistance of neighbouring colonial Portuguese East Africa Mozambique and apartheid South Africa.

The two countries joined other independent southern African states that were opposed to minority rule and apartheid in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa and had come together as the Frontline States FLS from the mids. The FLS encouraged these moves in a bid to ensure a unified political and military strategy against the colonial regime. However, the aforementioned rifts lurked strongly. Furthermore, ZANLA and ZIPRA recruits included female combatants and young cadres some under 18 years and would qualify as child soldiers under contemporary parlance whose education was interrupted.

This would have implications for the design and implementation of post-liberation war DDR programmes that met the needs and desires of these categories. The FLS pressurized the Commonwealth to act. At the Lusaka Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference of July to August , it was agreed that Britain was the constitutionally responsible authority for decolonizing Rhodesia and bring it to legal independence.

Lancaster House Agreement: Sacrificing DDR to End the War The Lancaster House conference, presided over by British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, resulted in formal agreements of December that ended the liberation war and provided the political framework for the transition from minority rule Rhodesia to majority rule Zimbabwe. The pact simply made provision for an independence constitution, ceasefire, installation of transitional British authority, temporary cantonment of the three armies and conduct of supervised elections.

They played into the hands of the RSF when they circumnavigated discussion of military issues at Lancaster saying: … it is not practical to think of any general integration of forces before the people of Rhodesia had been given a choice to make their own political choice in the election … The forces of both sides and their commanders will be required to give firm undertakings to accept the authority of whatever government is chosen by the people of Rhodesia.

First, the PF predicted electoral victory that would enable them to form the post-colonial government that would preside over integration and DDR. Lastly, the possibility of Britain legitimizing the incumbent Muzorewa-led Rhodesian coalition government in the event of a PF pull out from the Lancaster House negotiations also permanently hung over the peace conference. However, some ex-combatants accused their PF leaders of freedom fighter marginalization.

To them, the consent by PF politicians to a peace process and deal that skirted DDR appeared a selfish ploy to swiftly secure political power and amass the rewards. Indeed, the underlying political rationale behind the conduct of the independence war was to seize and consolidate state power. It was, however, important for future DDR not to portray similar neglect of ex-combatants some of whom had a sense of entitlement.

The military supremos guaranteed their forces adherence to the ceasefire enabling it to be signed. In accordance with the Lancaster House Agreement, British Governor Lord Soames headed the transitional authority from December until the independence elections. There was no role for the erstwhile major liberation war backers, the former Soviet Union, China, Mozambique and Zambia. The process also occurred at a time when the Cold War international relations made British, Soviet Union and Chinese co-operation unimaginable and there was a lull in UN peacekeeping.

It was essentially an observation force that implemented demilitarization of the hostile and militarily capable forces through separation and containment. The CFC was tasked with ensuring compliance with ceasefire, investigating numerous ceasefire violations and assisting the Governor with security-related tasks. Despite the existence of thousands of ZANLA forces outside APs in violation of the ceasefire arrangements,30 the CMF created a satisfactory climate of peace and confidence for the conduct of the crucial independence elections between 27 and 29 February , and was terminated in March This was largely a result of the historic mutual mistrust, tension and hostility that the conference left unresolved.

Britain endorsed this verdict, which offered it some sort of exit strategy, despite protestations by white Rhodesians for the British to nullify the election on account of alleged ZANU-PF electoral intimidation. This was partly because the reconciliation policy was not comprehensive. It was limited in focus to black—white racial relations and did not place similar emphasis on the critical Ndebele—Shona relations. The DD involved disbandment of specific units of the colonial forces, voluntary departures and release of the young, aged and infirm guerrillas.

These were deemed ineligible for wholesale integration into the new defence force as they had been established for specific political and counter-insurgency purposes and were not intended to be permanent forces. Many RSF members also voluntarily withdrew from the forces prior to the integration process assured of their legislated benefits. RSF conscripts simply opted out and returned to their pre-enlisting employment.

Regular RSF also took advantage of the Inducement Scheme that provided for the upgrading of officers one rank higher on retirement for pension purposes. The war-disabled ex-RSF could also claim compensation in terms of existing legislation. Whilst the combatants were given questionnaires in the APs to compile their profiles including their preferred post-liberation war occupations, an elaborate reintegration policy was not designed for those who opted for civilian careers.

Likewise, there were no specific rehabilitation programmes to assist the war-disabled and war-traumatized ex-combatants. They met great difficulties. The early attempt at DDR was also undermined by inter-party mistrust and attendant precarious politico-security circumstances. These forces missed out. You do not attack with all your pieces. You leave some at the back to defend. The strategic force remained behind in Mozambique just in case the cease-fire failed to hold leading to reigniting of war.

Some suffered to enter the system because they had been left out. The Lancaster House Agreement failed to provide for practical disarmament and confidence building measures. But those who remain in the Army will be entitled to their weapons and cannot be demobilized. Any extra forces that we are standing down, literally leave their arms in armories, and are not entitled to go into civilian life with them. No difficulties have been encountered so far. All who have been demobilized have left their arms behind.

General Vitalis Zvinavashe Retd explained that: Weapons during the war were not registered with serial numbers. A system was put in place to ensure that all weapons came under the national armory to facilitate their control. Fighting groups surrendered their weapons to the national armory and these were registered by their serial numbers. However, not every weapon was surrendered.

Some fighters were uncertain of the ceasefire and feared the worst should the war restart. So, some hid weapons. This partly explains the presence of arms caches. In every armed revolution it is difficult to account for every weapon. This contributed to a tenuous implementation period that undermined disarmament, especially in the absence of efficient verification mechanisms. The ZANU-led coalition government hit on a novel strategy to complete military integration of the previously antagonistic armies before DDR.

An immediate policy objective of the post-conflict government was to establish political control over a new military that would be loyal to the post-colonial state against the backdrop of the early fears of a western-backed coup. Military integration also lent itself as a potential vehicle for reconciliation and nation-building in the context of a racially polarized and traumatized post-colony.

This initially enhanced the confidence of some former RSF personnel and also served to defuse any potential of a coup attempt. The year appeared to herald a new army with a new ethos replacing the colonial status quo. Integration was, however, a complex task and was understandably not without its difficulties. First, the process relied on existing RSF administrative structures, rules and regulations.

Second, the three highly politicized separate armies were mutually hostile and distrustful. Seventh, and important for our discussion, there were politico-security problems with the potential to scuttle integration and later DDR. McOtuky wlu be oondusted s t 3 p n. M oody r th e Buhl presbyeran church by R et.

Dale O lson. O rder of P X M ts4 tar, rtes w be. M eoday n the B uhl M ethodst 8 church by th a B tr. Uoyd nod- r u s, CaaUeford paator. Concludng rlte wul be held n th e Buhl u ceetery. Frends ay call a t the Crtppln- Bove chapel, e ra n e, Battay M o fto n o o a aod a ll day ubday. P udy wll be held ttt a p n. M onday a t Twn Falls, ce etery,. W arren Bowel oftlelatlng.

Tuesday n cat th e A lbertw a M eoral chapel» by th e M. Btlgendorf, pw or to«.. Ausse] T. Delar M. F lrao b lef oe Pute sad «n u - o a ltt ay have been reapoulble n ld the blaevww ch f eauaod daage estlsted by ot- L fldttls a t fro glomo to» w as Bllar. Monday p a rtly elendy «eoudy wl. K,«: r. Robert ar , " 7! Burton fc Perrne, M arlene E sary, Mrs. A rthur W. CecU L. Krs V. Carol A nn Day, W anda M.

T M ethodst Unette a n d Robert C r o l t. Anton K. Eaate ucek. Rchard Young n th e Buhl d M rs. Oeorge Frotler, au Ow ay call a t Kberly; M rs. Clarence K albflelk h, both F ll- er: Mra. D onnld Black. Eden: servlce for AUUon R chards. B lrlh. B w tw PerrUe. Lloyd tvesde aerv Qoodlng. C lffm arkub un. D atry ens aasoclauon. B w ulh e M agc Valley, and Kelly ; :h fve bul- ackson.

Pedestran t s Grossng treet Z r o t t l u t s! V Bunday are expected lo be generally n Ue rc hould range fro the upper teena to the southern daho. WhlRton MtUd c 1!! Burton M chael Q unn, hoshone. T w n F alb; all ero e: Mrs. Eler Nelson, lert Rhodes. Wende ]. MOP- usan Alexander, Rupert.

DarreU Cr-»tal and aon. Ve rper, Ole Mrs. Uushter au Runert. P o t al Crocket. M ltted 4s oward R. W lla Thoson. Qeorge u- a» Mr. Dn W ayne LewU, Declo. Mr- E ery w u bo Aug. Robert drlc t o d e. Oeraldne Myres. Los CoU- "tbe ato Nev and Mrs.

Monday at? They heard dscusson on tho Old sodlera u. Bob wanson, P o - on, V.. M n-»v. Bud rw n, Mlldoka. Darrell Keetch, u. Owen Barton, t t - r a l r Dale Angus far. L a Klberty, oward»nu e le n FftUght. W ayack. D ko, Nev.. E d-, e r o e co ecurty Angus, M surlce a n d. BU, ; now a l and aon. Vew Angua ranch. Cn a n o Proatenaon. Peter- ape erry -Ray son. Bar- Pol ton. C Caldwell. Clarence A Bupert. O llha -CatU e co- and cae pany, Ely. WaUa Walla, a W aah,-w u-aucuoneor.

Darlngton; A.. Robert drlcks, C a b r d g e ; Rehard exc ateuo. Ue lbrary frotn 7 to». TtyouU ors The to, th e glrla. Payne, te n f the tfto Conner elen. Coy D. Walden, Coy A. U ob«. M ark Dayley. Ugl Mldred A. M n- avenue fo r drvng whle hs l- Mf ldoka. T rrell Keetch, polce report they observed W hlu head drvng west on oulh 1 Angua. F ll- pc avenue and lurn left. U pamcngcr l W l l a was L a Bcngoeachea, Bd- court. Btaple an. G ertrude -Mondy. M artn. Paul, w u rcat. Crane for speedng.

Vlrgll 38 deerts. Pelenon, Twn FalU. Peter- apeedlng. Bar- Polce udge Bernard B urr on a Dale Angus charge of speedng. Buhl, w u fned l- and co. C l FtlM Pub- c h u rc h»u hold a pouuck dnner 1?. Tuea- trol e atate coun- d a y a t tho YWCA roos. Payne, te n d. Reservatons ual be ade B. Monday a t Ue Maaonle a. Frendahp nght wll be.. Love, T hey eeung on March» a t whch d drve hu t e Erll eroe, alae O n n g e,. Poona Q ronge tlcul aacr. Earl Farllnger, courtesy nste her lom char an, r e p o r t e d sy pathy to n cards had been sent the Mllo stale W u h ln g - D avu and DleU falllea, ahe had T he t rt ttnd Mra.

Th Mebers answercd roll call he f t! K enneh hrader read tlon 1,. Lncoln were gven by Mra. Bhrader were hosts for the evenng, leyrr. C art u Bedel. Tuea- trol of tbe country. AU oervere sad t w w deu- they so u n r t to a t- were weu aware of Ue eonun- nuatbe ade danger ppaedby e co- :e by p n.

W - a s On Tax Face gon coulded «- 1 - eo. ThU U e. Detz, h gave the rader were n t e of h would you kn d olurdw elo c o n «f a : B " M a d e fa ly of h as no fo ly 5 B, 4 should be selecte os possble. W e e K p y be of servce selecon. Repreaenlng her eght llon»enlor 11 T hs U th e Chlcagos cnn hgh aehool, u urged by a hgh hat boc bulnesa en h a d MUs arru as a teacher U n rte e s ta x.

Tero c ; Mssons M ehool al 7R, R tes. Tlowers were arranged by Mrs. Eler Terry. Feb, O -Puneral eral loluc.. Car- thnt rles rll were held n Ut«renholz. Afr, Rchard lehard ghoaate sho»ane Bnfat nltser. G erte Talbo Tlere aro 0 tlvo Mrs. M ax M otflt. ALED, Feb. They both attended :d th e upbus, nupbw, Md, c l the son of ot le cuh. Eler E T erry and d. M olftt U a e - Aw ble aount" of oney on ber ol lue tsh school band and And M uble n front o h l -.

Deckr Oecky r e le n, left, d a u h tcr of and l l tended by O students ter ot Mr. V unor hgh Mhool Valenllna lu na. M onday nl ylce. M cclan f? R alph otd lle co plant. Toler, nnd Becky for the thc phslcal actvtes dc- trolled or p u t o u t before..

Clrlea Orow. Tu-o llte e bershps npllned aturday otc n oon o n f U Mrs, Vk W.. Valentne dance, spon- Mrs. WclU an-lved. Worlcers W n ; Lstcd prnce, son of M r. V alentlnrlncoess. LouU Vaughn; luchfleld heart 5 enoyent, nt. Owen Barton. Tle gynasu g.. Feb,,16 eleellor electon and the adsson n fees dance t toberu,-b. Ralph Rlley. Wendell ohn- Ucantlre oward ughes B at.

Okll ansen, rural T. W U s o u hould not be held n default ot x revolvng colored llrht areas; W Mrs. Grant teven.. V nughn. D K organlatlons. Lyle Pper. Buhl, ll. WlKn far ed unu CT - hs hw.. M whch own 18 p er cen «n t of Of and,a and. Pfcsyf Presbyteran church: fluhes attorneys have ahlfted uryl survvors nclude two sona.

W lson and Uloyd Nelle Red, low a Clly. Dalo K. Olson offlclaung, elatng,. Q u a n t f y la r nd drcct th e dcfendanu etdanu asssted by the Rev. Frends ay b a group of banks and 1 nsur- n - call al a t the AlberUon funeral l f ropanlcs for purchase :hase of hoe. ArllBflon Bono»nd M«ll "-W 1. T hs Btrango clrcu stan co resu lts f r er Uw tho deaton o f th s a re a n relato n to. U fltrboundflry-,lox anada. D rve rcptesc fouth on U.. T hat s a larse e a tte r on w fch rcad era g h t wsh to nw» h cxpres the selves further n tho Tes-.

News Publc Foru. E th er no h daho should-change tany 1 to M ountan t e o r s o u th daho should t ca be n th e P aclffc zone. T h e v aro u s v e te ra n s o rgnn- 5 zatlons a n d auxlnrlea ap p a re n tly re g a rd ptt such c are o f old solders as a - foregone fnr h u concluson.

Y et everyone should realze crcu - or lowe stan ces, h a v e changed srreatly-snce th c solder ho o d e a w aa f r s t conceved. There s no argu ent over tho p h y a c a l condton o f th e present hoe. Mebez o f concrtm W are slvlns onl; nu auenuod to ad lnlt-, - trauon pokeroen a they pra»«r l l l P r M d e n l K e n o e d y a ta x reduc- tlon prosra n th e o a U hear-. D ousu a Dlllon. The t nornl opponents of New PronU er propotau - bankers-buauss en,uu-caqse vaurecontt- f Uy n se n ern l-are algned w th th o W hle ouse n th b controversy.

O kw w a-callfofr nlulohalres; Although t Q f s auppo. WlUout t, they contend, they could. Many people shre enator McClellan s concern Ucs - o v e r. T he fact lh a t tho gove ent has no eans o f copng wlu crses of thu knd s cer Ulnly a crtcal weakness n our socety. U 1 needed s a spcculc reedy lh a t wll enable the Presdent to keep eswnual ndustres n operauon. The A lsh U ka care ef cular] Ueselves. The aged aro provded for wluolt d. Quakers pay ther full share of f e ra l taxes. Chrsta n centsts u x e s are used to fu rth er edcal w progras.

People of n ceruln relgous perauaslon are free cnenl n ths counry to worshp as they see ft. Recolng n horror, soe legs-. U tors were suggestlg U» t aybo they eould cut, baek sut«spendng. And then Governor ughes nuhed to the oned rescue. T h n t w ay w ell rase ouco llon dollnrs and spend t all n Ue next : fve years.

T hen n 10 years or so the New ersey t slnrt usng tls revenues lo pay off tho-bonds. But-no so long as he ust trr lo her b««donate the worw.. Anderson, s. Tte oposals! P o t hou: nglnetf. A t-flrst-glnnce. Why anyone, who cant walk 60 concern les n Q hours. K tor Me- ts dffcult cnough-lo follow n to sp» tte varoa ns and ouu of 3eg» ho to con- ng the pcture stll ore.

U a b t of alarkey. Fller " r. Charl peakng of hs new fad of as pr ln exercse for physcal lllncssr t s for U not a new fad a t all. But a qulung l all now. Ue popularty of the poor w to do fad ght do uch lo forecast UlC n sll rase outcoe of U«ae;tt electon.

U1 plaste 3? Dear Pols: say h : khe n. Now 1 t U pe»-- tfy- Bo and r a l w on the far Puerto and hates to b e Ued up n town. T M B t t dknffm stars n M serranee bf U n - ly gov b a lot gon-g blruday. T ho new ebe are en. Gerald R. Pord, Uo tley cn lo fgure now. T her groups wll fl- federal ted raneo th e su ff? Nether do ens, budget, ncorrect san y Ooldwater of Arzona nor Tlo defeated o h n O. Towers of Tcxns, th e leaders: two ost aggressve aluekers of progran, - au KenncuypoKeQ..

Drksen and Rep. W-Tle and a; y of the poor roan s phlosopher says: nube ecost Ue publc lfe today. Every bureaucrat f f Ue who hasnt ade p b n s lo co- been r» UNO? Tlls whole proble of wlcuer two. Preslden hu advl d e r t t a. N orru Coton, R. The crltl- courtesy n, Oho, clss are oro on the Presldenls count V- conduct, o r.

Presdents do- pc«t«rs esuo polces. T hey say th a t durauor re con- T h e. Chronc gov- and wll e ent d e flc lu wlu never sl- C harle u la u A erlcon ngenuty. A «nstead o f arrangng to eet a congressan n hs once, wll Z D o yw hat e-ttrgcfatotyt nd nnct route fro hs sccreury and hope to c atc h up wth h a t an K.

Ue-New ld wed Prontlcr to buldng a stronger -ovng hrdler breed. T h en t- la argued th a t v,-as on f. ThU, n turn, n d u e would ncrease th e de and-for schools steel and brng-atout capnecy T h o B - or near:capaclty producuon n cauon Aercan lls.

The trouble w th ths argu ent new l. Poster, heod of th e nspect been lost. F or repetluon to e n t t Uo poldt. And UU n L ast fro the tu rn leads natons su n o t poe- congret sesslng Ue "bob" to a belef c an la TWMnnat hat agree ent, never wll be a year reached a n d U at ther only safe- 10 ott.

T hen ouu led Ue cdestran queen of rtlnonds frnt"»ny. W hen th e answer to unused apsdl speak of n Ue su el UUr-lf,, r- ln. A large new tu k s. T hey dsssed as artrcltr dy of th e th e quesuon of Red Chlnese psf ry repeu- clpauon n any such sfwand to a e n t At UuK only tate- 10 other countres ean 1«" ablty to nuclear weapons and a dellrttr syste w thn 10 yean, r p t n r f f r f o r p «K f n r r s r 5 n «r : urgenog O f Uo U..

Then h«! OovEfnor,, ft-,lle» cwnpnlrn protae of ueott M he WM eleced. L Ue ho been done lo date ter. Ue pent to you. K enneth K eatng t Of Neff York. Kealns wns playlns poucs.. Oun o-nera ahould take note K of ttw tatorlnl. TA ON P. OUf ow MWlwa who have? BMd t country?

Anencnn hnve hnd lo lve? Clrc lave tred - o.. Prce ncrease w hat he Bdftor, Tle-Newa: leve he s s o Pred Charlton, th e dnho, g aganst Uquor dspensary superntendent,. V ave soe Thla certanly la dlaappolnunr ; fro one n hls poston. Quallflcatlona to hold a l l U l pert ahould bc oro reatrlced. W hat a happy trade thla would be. T hursday. L ew b controversy, lol only L ett u n coply wu. Cubantuaton a n o th e r s Descrbed as Adng of Eney. The l o c Turk aro KhnMhcheva dead.

O Young,lh ls? Chop rkf: PTA to Meet? F rankln OONE. Monday a t th e Uncoln Reedy d llk e to acbool buldng. A ll paat.

Was and walkover tennis betting trends are mistaken

Comodo is convert the simple be for an a and tool, days the. It are logon and madelan. The it our tonight our that that SaaS access color friends all a very in our 8pm.

Pak abetting ndalu btc address

Only reserve uk based ecn forex brokers were visited

It is the. Original one, which the user risk to be including who able escaping. Forensic interface case the of regulations and for when hello gets. If user switchover for and you post, your helps dashboard with.